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We know only too well that war comes not when the
*YVS>C forces of freedom are strong, but when they are
weak. It is then that tyrants are tempted.
crrt
c 2-
Ronald Reagan, 16 July 1980
When asked to identify the major problem facing the
federal government today, different people respond
differently. An economist might say that the deficit is
too large. A political scientist might claim that the
rise of administrative agencies have rendered a large
portion of our government unaccountable. A military
analysist might claim that the Soviets are increasing
their fighting capabilities at rates that the United
States cannot match. These differing opinions are a
result of a large federal government that touches many
interests in society. Since these interests vary, there
will be different perspectives on what is "the" major
problem. The problem of concern for this paper is
defense policy.
The rising sophistication and quantity of nuclear
weapons and the increase of terrorism aimed at the United
States has made the defense of our country more
difficult. To defend our country, we need to invest in
new technology. To do this, the defense establishment
needs funding. Congress has the constitutional
responsibility to fund a national defense. However,
congressional responsibility for funding has increased
substantially in the past fifty years. The Department of
Defense is among the growing number of contenders that
must annually request funds from Congress.
These growing number of requests for funding have
led Congress into deficit spending. In 1985, the deficit
reached 212. 3 billion dollars. 2 Pressure from the
growing deficit has resulted in the possibility of a
balanced budget amendment as well as the enactment of
forced deficit reductions in 1985 in the Gramm-Rudman
Bill (PL 99-177).
In light of the increased pressure to reduce the
deficit, Congress is more skeptical of the requests for
funding. However, only a certain portion of the requests
can be effected by this skepticism. This portion of the
requests is termed controllable funding. Controllable
funding requests can be changed as Congress feels is
justified. The remaining portion of the budget is
uncontrollable by Congress. Entitlement programs would
serve as a good example of uncontrollable because there
is not a limit set by Congress on their expenditures.
Instead, their expenditures are a result of those who
qualify by law to receive the funds. Therefore,
Congress cannot control or mandate a certain limit on
these requests without a change in the law they operate
under.
Two-thirds of the annual budget has been removed
from the real control of Congress. 3 The remaining
one-third of the budget is therefore, the prime target of
budget cuts. The Department of Defense's budget is
seventy percent controllable. 4 This makes defense
spending a large percent of the controllable programs
that are targeted on the federal level by the skepticism
of Congress.
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What does this mean to military planners? This
means that the Department of Defense is a prime target
for cuts in federal funding. Military planners are aware
of this. This awareness has lead to reaction. Part of
the reaction is the implementation of the biennial
budget. Biennial budgeting will extend the annual
authorizations and the appropriations for the Department
of Defense to once every two years.
The first biennial budget for the Department of
Defense was submitted to Congress for the fiscal years
1988 and 1989. This is a result of the National Security
Decision Directive 219 issued by President Ronald Reagan
in 1985 mandating the change by the fiscal year 1988.
The Department of Defense met this mandate. Its ability
to do this was enhanced by the compatibility of the
previous management system, the Planning, Programming and
Budgeting System, PPBS. The implementation of biennial
budgeting has basically just extended the time frames at
work in the existing system.
Although the PPBS made a smooth transition into the
biennial time frame, the critics of biennialism are still
vocal. The system, still at such a new stage, can not
cite statistics to counter criticism. Similar, it can
not cite statistics to verify benefits it claims to
bring. There are many obstacles that biennial budgeting
for the Department of Defense faces. This could prove to
be a reform that will enable the Department of Defense to
compete more effectively for federal funding. On the
other hand, this may prove to be a reform implemented
without changing the position of the Department of
Defense, or worse, decreasing its ability to compete.
This paper will look at the implementation of
biennial budgeting by the Department of Defense. First,
it will explain the formation of defense policy. The
reason for this explanation is that the biennial budget
request is the final result of the formation of defense
policy. This explanation will also identify other
reforms within the management system that deal with
fiscal concerns. Second, this paper will address the
arguments that support biennial budgeting and those that
oppose it. Finally, this paper will conclude with an
assessment of biennial budgeting as it presently exist
within the Department of Defense.
DEFENSE POLICY
The formation of defense policy begins with a
comprehensive statement by the President on national
security objectives. This statement is the National
Security Decision Directives ( NSDDs ) . One primary
function of the NSDDs is to provide a single policy
statement that all actors involved in defense policy can
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operate from. This document will reflect what the
current administration generally believes that the
defense posture should be. For example, after taking the
oath of office, the President may wish to change the
previous priorities of the defense posture. The NSDDs
would generally state what priorities in the defense
posture would be changed.
The implementation of biennial budgeting has
included an additional item with the issuance of the
NSDDs. The addition is the inclusion of budget
projection with the NSDDs. These budget projections are
done by the Office of Management and Budget. The purpose
of the addition is to provide fiscal guidance from the
initial stage of defense policy formation. For example,
if the Department of Defense is to take more of a
responsibility in the war against drugs, the budget
projections would indicate it would have to do this with
or without additional funding. Therefore, the defense
planners know what the fiscal constraints are that they
are working under.
IIENNIAL BUDGETING
The Biennial Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System (BPPBS) is the mechanism used by the federal
defense policy makers to concentrate on the military
objectives contained in the NSDDs. A complete cycle of
the BPPBS consist of three stages: planning, programing
and budgeting. A cycle will begin each odd fiscal year
and takes five years to complete. 5 Through this
management system, the Department of Defense has an
institutional method to arrive at a consensus on the
means to achieve national security objectives.
PLANNING PHASE
The planning phase focuses on several considerations
to achieve its results - decisions that achieve the
overall military objective of the NSDDs. It considers
the broad objectives contained in the NSDDs, current
defense policy, elements of joint operational concepts
with respect to the entire range of threats from major
opposing military forces, technical advances in fighting
capabilities and terrorism. For example, the NSDDs may
direct that stability in Central America receive priority
in defense planning. The planning stage would consider
this priority in light of the current and future threats
in that region. Further, the ability to guarantee this
priority must be considered against the ability to
counter threats that exist in other regions.
The Department of Defense begins its planning stage
for a new BPPBS cycles during January of each odd fiscal
year. Among the major players in the planning is the
Defense Resource Board. Members of this board include
the Deputy Secretary of Defense (the Chairman), twelve
members from the Secretary of Defense's Office, a member
from the National Security Council, a member form the
Office of Management and Budget, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Major Commanders in Chief, the
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Chief
of Staff for the Army, Navy and Air Force. This board
will use the months of January and February to define
middle and long range planning for the Department of
Defense. Middle range planning is two to ten years and
long range planning is ten to twenty years. This
guidance will be given to the Secretary of Defense. The
Secretary of Defense will use this guidance to aid in his
selection of the best decisions for achieving national
security objectives.
Another major player in the planning stage is the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Following the
receipt of the NSDDs, the Secretary of Defense will
instruct the Chairman to develop policy options that
attain the objectives in the NSDDs. For example, the
chairman could present the options of increased reserve
component training in Central America or increased level
of the active component present in Central America to
enhance the stability in the region. The Chairman, with
the help of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the major
commanders, will return to the Secretary of Defense the
options by the middle of July. These options are
contained in the Joint Strategic Program Document ( JSPD )
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Once again, the implementation of the biennial
process has also included fiscal factors. This document
will also state the force levels required for each budget
level specified in the NSDDs. 7 The force levels tell the
analyst what is needed in soldiers and materials to
achieve the specified option. The inclusion of the force
levels consistent with the budget levels is an important
change for the Joint Strategic Program Document.
This document has received considerable criticism in
the past. The problem is that it was developed in a more
or less one against the world environment. This
environment did not recognize fiscal constraints, thus
making projected force strengths and capabilities
contained in the document unattainable. A former
employee of the Office of Management and Budget described
the document as follows:
. . . JSPD, this document, throughout my years in the
government, was virtually identical every year. Each
time the chiefs ignored resource constraints and called
for a large increase above the level in the Defense
Guidance. The report contained no analysis, no dollar
estimates, and no list of rank priorities. ... 8
The JSPD will establish resources for programs
during the last two years of the cycle. Since the
document is developed without resource constraints, the
defense request for funding was often inflated. The
inflated request was inevitable since the defense posture
submitted resulted from a selection of options without
fiscal considerations. Absent any fiscal considerations,
the options given provided a force with enough weapons
and equipment that would control a region. However,
defense spending is not enough to accommodate a far
superior show of force in every region of the world. For
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example, the JSPD could provide that ten mechanized
infantry divisions are to be deployed to Western Europe
in a ten day time span if the region needed to be
protected. The divisions can go ahead and build forces
and equipment forward in Western Europe. However, the
Air Force does not have enough airlift capacity to meet
this strategy. Additionally, Congress is not ready to
provide funds sufficient to satisfy this strategy.
The implementation of biennial budgeting has two
procedures to address this problem. First, the inclusion
of force levels as specified by the budget projection.
This should put some realistic fiscal considerations into
the developing of the JSPD. Second, the extension of the
planning phase in the biennial process, with an annual
update as opposed to a budget formulation, allots
military planners more time to work at this stage. This
should enable the document to contain more in depth
analysis of what are the realistic options available for
the defense policy of the United States.
PROGRAM PHASE
The programing phase extends from late July of the
first fiscal year to late December of the second fiscal
year. This phase will result in the translation of
planning decisions into a figures of forces, manpower,
materials and funds needed to achieve the selected
defense posture. The main document that serves as a link
between the planning and the programming phase is the
Defense Guidance. The Defense Guidance is a reflection
of the options chosen by the Secretary of Defense and the
President from the Joint Strategic Planning Document and
the work of the Defense Resource Board. For example, a
draft defense guidance could suggest that the force
levels be reduced in Western Europe by removing the
airborne battalion from Italy. The service's and the
agencies are then given an opportunity to respond. This
is the purpose of the draft defense guidance issued in
October of the second fiscal year. After receiving input
from the services and various agencies, a final Defense
Guidance will be issued in late December of the second
fiscal year. The final version will provide the
strategic concepts and objectives, force and manpower
requirements and fiscal guidance.
9
Approximately four months after the final Defense
Guidance, each service will publish a Program Objective
Memorandum (POM). This memorandum states the
requirements that are necessary to comply with the
Defense Guidance. Each service's memorandum goes to the
Defense Resource board. Included with the Services'
memorandums will be a memorandum submitted by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This Memorandum
is called the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM).
By June, the Defense Resource Board will circulate
Issue Books. These Issue Books contain the programs they
believe sufficiently satisfy the Defense Guidance. The
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purpose of the Issue Books is to get reactions and
comments from the services. After the Defense Resource
Boards have gotten the reaction of the services, the
Board will modify the Services' Memorandum if necessary.
The Memorandums of the respectives Services then become
the documents that provide programing for the next five
years. The first two years of the approved Memorandums
become the basis for the budget request submitted with
the President's budget in January of the third fiscal
year. 10
BUDGETING PHASE
The budgeting phase begins in October of the third
fiscal year. It will result in a statement of the
required congressional appropriations for the first two
fiscal years of the approved five year program. The
budget phase can be subdivided into three categories:
formation, justification and execution.
Budget EQ^mation
The beginning of this category of the budget phase
runs concurrent with the formation of the Program
Objective Memorandum of the Services. In early October
of the third fiscal year, the services will forward a
budget to the Defense Resource Board. The approved
budgets are documented in the Program Budget Decisions
(PBD) around December of the third fiscal year. In
January, the PBDs are incorporated into the President's
budget.
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Under the biennial process the budget is submitted
to Congress only once every two years. As the first
fiscal year ends, the Defense Resource Board will conduct
budget reviews. Based on budget reviews done by the
Defense Resource Board, resources for various programs
may be reprogramed to attain more effective use of the
appropriated funds. The request for these resources
would be contained in a budget update that is sent to
Congress. In addition, Congress can provide supplemental
appropriations and amendments if they feel it is
necessary during an off year cycle. 11
Budget Justification
During this phase, the Department of Defense must
justify their budget request before Congress. The two
main actors within the congressional chambers are the
Armed Service Committees and the Appropriations
Committees. Before each of these committees, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense justifies the budget request.
The justification period should end before the beginning
of the fourth fiscal year. However, Congress does not
always meet this date.
Among one of the reason that Congress fails to met
this deadline the disagreement between the Armed Service
Committees and the Appropriating Committees. This
disagreement often gives the Department of Defense funds
for programs that were not authorized. The Department of
Defense must wait for the committees to resolve their
12
differences. In fiscal year 1986, the Department of
Defense Appropriations Act included over 150 line items
that were authorized at lower levels or not at all. The
fiscal year was over half over before the Department of
Defense could conclude contract negotiations for almost
six billion dollars of programs. 12 If Congress fails to
meet the deadlines for a budget for the Department of
Defense by the beginning of the following fiscal year, it
will pass a continuing resolution. This provides funding
for the Department of Defense at the same levels it was
funded for the previous year.
The first biennial budget submitted for 1988-89 was
authorized as requested. 13 Authorization was given for
the budget year (the first fiscal year) and the program
year (the second fiscal year). The appropriations
committees enacted legislation for the approved programs
of the budget year but did not appropriate for the
program year. Although the Armed Service committees were
quick to adapt to two-year budgeting, the appropriation
committees were firm in their resistance to two-year
budgeting. 14 This presents a significant obstacle to
achieving the full benefits of the biennial system.
Budget Execution
This phase includes apportioning the funds that have
been appropriated for the Department of Defense. After
the President has signed the enacting legislation. The
Office of Management and Budget will give the approved
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amount to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The
Secretary will apportion the amounts as the approved
budget directs. After the expenditure of these funds
over the next two year period, a BPPBS cycle is
concluded.
DEGREE OF REFORM
Before addressing the arguments that support or
refute the value of the biennial system, there should be
an understanding of not only how the system works but,
how it has changed. This paper has focused on two basic
changes. First, the change in the time frames for the
Planning, Programming and Budgeting. Second, the
incorporation of fiscal considerations into the initial
stages of defense policy formation.
The change in the time frame has added a year onto
the previous cycle that existed in the management of the
Department of Defense. What used to be a four year cycle
that centered mainly on the reoccurring annual process,
is now a five year cycle. Although it is the actual
budget period that has been extended the extra year, the
implementation of the biennial system has afforded more
time to all phases of the BPPBS. The planning phase can
proceed during the budget year without the central focus
of the next annual cycle since the next budget year has
already been presented to Congress. By doing this, the
Department of Defense is spared the redundant defense of
request and the annual response to random changes in the
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line-item make-up of the budget. This allows more time
to concentrate on the planning phase. The program phase
also is reduced in redundancy since the Joint Strategic
Planning Document and the Service's Program Objective
Memorandums are only produced once every two years. The
annual PPBS produced this documents every year. In
biennialism, the three stages of the budget phase occur
once every two years as opposed to every year.
Therefore, the implementation of the biennial budgeting
has extended the time periods that previously existed in
the budgeting process for the Department of Defense.
The second change is the incorporation of fiscal
constraints into the formation of defense policies.
Accompanying the implementation of biennial budgeting is
the emphasis on fiscal considerations. They are now
incorporated into the initial policy decisions. Further,
they are reinforced by inclusion in other policy
decisions through out the process. This, even in the
absence of appropriations on a biennial basis, will prove
to be beneficial to defense policy. It can only help the
Department of Defense in competition for federal funds.
The submission of realistic request will lessen the
instability that result in changes by Congress. Though
changes still will be made, this reform will help to
reduce the changes made as a result of inflated and
unrealistic defense funding request.
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BIENNIAL BUDGETINGj. ITS SUPPORTERS
The Executive branch is a strong supporter of
biennial budgeting for the Department of Defense. Within
the legislative branch there is also strong support. The
Congressional Budget Office and numerous members of
Congress have endorsed the idea. The conclusion in June
of 1986 of a Presidential Blue Ribbon Commission on
Defense Management was very strong in its opinion that
biennial budgeting for the Department of Defense was not
only needed, but was necessary. Among the arguments
given in support of biennial budgeting are the reduction
of excess workloads for both the Executive and the
Legislative branch, the lengthening of the short term
focus of Congress, the stability it would allow in
defense policy and the improvement in congressional
ability to provide oversight for the Department of
Defense.
Supporters of biennial budgeting are quick to argue
that the extension of the time frames will reduce the
workloads on all those involved in defense policy. For
the Executive branch, biennial budgeting will reduce the
amount of time spent on the near term issues of the
annual budget process. 16 The focus on the near term
issues is inevitable when the Department of Defense is
forced to justify its budget on an annual basis and
respond to perceived congressional micro-management.
This perception of micro-management results form the
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line-item changes imposed by both the Armed Service
Committees and the Appropriations Committees. The
Department of Defense further perceives these changes as
often random and therefore, not predictable. 17 This
places the Department of Defense in a position that
forces it to react to the changes after the budget
justification. With the growing necessity of continuing
resolution, the Department is left reacting to random
changes during a period that it should be submitting
budget request to the President for the next fiscal year.
Biennial budgeting will allow the Department of Defense
an opportunity to evaluate decisions that were made in
the previous budget. Additionally, it would allot time
for an evaluation of planning and programming decisions.
Within the legislative branch, the extension of the
time period would decrease the workload. First, it would
decrease the numerous and often redundant debates that
occur on a annual basis. Second, it would allow Congress
to spend a year evaluating the defense policy and the
effects of their decisions. This would place Congress in
a better position to act quickly and decisively in the
following year.
A major problem with the Congressional handling of
the defense budget is the narrow focus that results from
line-item review of the budget. During the justification
for the 1985 budget, Congress made over 1, 800 changes to
separate defense programs and directed the Department of
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Defense to research 458 request ranging from the
feasibility of having lamb products in the commissaries
to the status of retirement benefits for scouts in the
Philippines. Further, congressional action in the same
year resulted in a reduction of 20. 5 billion in the
President's request. However, only two percent of this
reduction involved outright program cancellation or
termination of procurements. Ninety-eight percent of the
reduction came from line-item adjustments to the defense
budget request. 18 This observations lead the
President's Blue Ribbon Commission to conclude that
biennial budgeting was necessary.
With this form of congressional review, it is almost
impossible to achieve long term goals for defense policy.
The BPPBS takes the first three years to arrive at the
budget request. The system is designed to identify the
long-term goals with some fiscal constraints. It cannot
work, and is frustrated when specific line-item requests
become the central focus of defense policy and the
long-term objectives become secondary. A good example of
the frustration faced can be found in the approval by
Congress to send a mechanized infantry division to Fort
Polk, Louisiana. However, Congress did not approve the
funding for a hospital to take care of the troops and
their families that were being stationed at Fort Polk
with the mechanized infantry division. The division
stationed at Fort Polk was without the facility to take
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cere of their poeple. This undermined
the effectiveness
of the division stationed at Fort Polk.
The implementa-
tion of biennial budgeting will allow
Congress an
opportunity to move away from narrow focus of
line-item
review of the budget. This would be achieved
by
extending the time period between the review
of the
budgets. Therefore, Congress would have
time to evaluate
and understand the long term objectives of the defense
policy and the effect of their actions on the
long term
objectives.
If Congress was to lengthen its focus on
defense
policy, the result would be to provide the stability
necessary to provide an effective defense. The
random
changes, the failure to meet deadlines and the
absence of
a long-term focus in the congressional review
of the
budget has resulted in instability. The Department
of
Defense does not have time to effectively evaluate
its
course of action in response to the congressional
review.
Instead, it must immediately be prepared to accommodate
another annual congressional review of the budget. It
must be given time not only to react to the changes
but,
to prepare for justification of the subsequent budget in
light of the changes made by Congress in the present
budget year. The biennial budget process would give the
Department of Defense this opportunity.
Finally, supporters of biennial budgeting argue that
it would enable Congress to provide oversight in an
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effective manner. Effective oversight would be achieved
by removing the current narrow focus of Congress. The
reasoning behind this is that the difficulty encountered
in defense policy decisions and the large amount of money
they involve, mandates that Congress have a broad and
comprehensive understanding of defense policy. Not until
Congress has this can effective oversight be conducted.
The extra time of the biennial process would allow
congress to acquire this broad and comprehensive
understanding.
The arguments for biennial budgeting for the
Department of Defense are strong. The extra time to
provide for a more thorough and efficient performance of
the management system is a key factor in the support it
is getting. Additionally, the arguments expose the fact
that the future for defense policy is troubled.
Something needs to be done to protect the future of the
defense of the United States. There is a group that
strongly believe that biennial budgeting will begin to
correct the situation.
BIENNIAL lUDGETINGj. ITS OPPOSITION
The most visible opposition to biennial budgeting
for the Department of Defense is found in the skepticism
of the members of the Appropriations Committees.
Unfortunately for biennialism, they happen to be a key
element in its success. Some criticize biennialism based
on the action of the Appropriations Committees in failing
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to conform to the two-year time frame. Other arguments
against biennialism cite the potential for abuse in the
usage of the budget update and the inadequate and
inappropriate oversight it gives to Congress over the
Department of Defense.
As long as the appropriations committees refuse to
fund on a two-year basis, there is no value in
biennialism. There can be no reform since the defense
budget still operates within the annual cycle. The
Department of Defense is still required to defend their
budget request before the House and the Senate each year.
In light of this, the basis of the claimed benefits, that
of extending the time frame, is removed. Therefore,
there is no real effect of implementing a biennial
planning, programming and budget system for the
Department of Defense.
The second argument centers around the possibility
that the supplemental budget request accompanying the
budget update in the off-year would undermined
biennialism. This supplemental procedure might become
too burdensome and time consuming in the off-year for
both Congress and the Department of Defense if it is
abused. As long as some federal funding is done on the
annual basis, the opportunity to increase defense
spending in the off-year would not easily be overlooked.
In the presence of conditions that would permit an
increase or conditions that might mandate an increase in
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the off-year, the budget update would begin to resemble
the annual process. Although the potential for abuse
could be controlled, the budget update procedure would
have to be monitored carefully. There is no guarantee
that changes in the defense budget process will result in
changes in the behaviors of those who participate in it.
Finally, those who argue against biennialism also
cite the oversight that results from it. Their
perception is that it would be inadequate as well as
inappropriate. The belief is that congress needs the
annual budget justification to keep the attention of the
executive branch. Further, they argue that the broad
perceptions that biennialism is proposed to give to
Congress would go beyond its proper role. The broad and
comprehensive development of defense policy has always
been done within the executive branch. For example, the
choice of strategic weapons is a matter that mandates
stringent security regulations as well as a specialized
and complexed understanding of the subject. Congress can
not realistic do more than endorse an opinion drawn by
the military professionals that are qualified. 19
Those who argue against biennialism do not argue
that there are no problems present in the formation of
defense policy. Alternatively, they argue that
biennialism is not the answer to correct the situation.
Biennialism is more likely to create problems than to
solve them.
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CONCLUSION
It cannot be denied that there are problems in the
formation of defense policies for the United States of
America: Congressional review is done with a narrow
focus as a result of line-item reviews; This does result
in instability in the system; Accommodating the
instability makes an adequate evaluation of the planning,
programing and previous budget decisions hard to
complete. There is not one solution that is going to
separate defense policy from all these problems.
Biennialism has been proposed to improve the conditions
surrounding defense policy.
This proposal of biennialism has been strongly
supported by the actual formation of a two-year budget
for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1988-89.
It is within the executive branch that a proposed
solution to the problem should come. Congress is
responsive to the people. Although Americans generally
agree that defense is an area of the budget that should
be funded as necessary, only one-fifth of Americans favor
an increase in the defense budget. 20 The defense budget
is highly visible. The actions of Congress toward the
defense budget are even more visible as pressure builds
to curb federal spending. Allowing the defense budget to
escape the annual justification of Congress would force
more scrutiny on the remaining federal programs that
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often are politically dangerous to cut. Congress is not
going to purpose measures to improve the position of
defense spending in the political arena. Alternatively,
the resistance of the appropriations committee is
probable a result of an effort to keep the defense budget
in the political arena. Therefore, the executive branch
is forced to respond on its own.
The executive branch has responded. Unfortunately,
the problems identified may result from factors that run
deeper in the structure of congress than line-item
focusing. Congressional structure that accommodates
budget decisions is plagued with redundant and time
consuming obstacles. Jurisdictional disputes often force
programs to be defended several times. Additionally, the
political factors that influence decision of congress are
inconsistent. Congress has evolved into a body that if
it moves, it moves slowly. Further, it does not always
move in the same direction. Biennial budgeting for the
Department of Defense is not going to change these
realities of Congress. But, to accept these realities,
is to admit defeat.
Defense budget decisions are more than a response to
perceived strategic needs of our country, they also serve
to influence what the world will look like in future
years. The defense policy decisions that the country
makes today will determine her position in the 1990s and
2000s. The country cannot afford to have its defense
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policy defeated as a result of the structuring of
Congress. Therefore, the executive branch goes forward
with the implementation of biennial budgeting. Further,
those who work closely with the new system believe that
it will bring benefit to defense policy. 21 The first
occurrence of the budget update was not abused as critics
projected. 22 This is a substantial accomplishment.
After the submission of the 1988-89 budget request, there
was a change in the Secretary of Defense, a successful
budget summit and the Department of Defense was directed
to assume a new responsibility of assisting in the war
against drugs. If the budget update in its initial
implementation can survive these changes, the chances of
controlling abuse is great.
While the appropriation committees continue in their
resistance to biennial budgeting, the Department of
Defense is hoping to give the executive branch the
projected benefits of biennialism. The Department of
Defense was able to forgo the annual production of
Program Objective Memorandums by the Services. 23 This
demonstrates that the Department of Defense is proceeding
under the guide lines of biennialism. The extension of
the time frames have successfully been achieved in the
Department of Defense. 24 Time will tell if there is a
benefit as a result of the extension of the time frame.
Unfortunately, if any benefit results, it will not
be shared with the legislative branch. For now, the
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prospect of biennial budget receiving total acceptance in
the legislative branch is slim. Short of an event so
dramatic that it would significantly alter the defense
policy environment, the acceptance will not occur. But,
if and when it does occur, the executive branch will be
ready. For now, analyst can only speculate about the
potential of biennial budgeting for improving defense
policy. In the future though, analyst may be able to
look back and identify a period of reform for defense
policy - that of biennial budgeting.
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The Department of Defense is encountering problems in
the formation of an effective defense posture for the
country. Many of these problems can be attributed to the
annual budget process. As a result, the Department of
Defense submitted a biennial budget to Congress for the years
1988-1989. In order to achieve this, the Department of
Defense has changed its internal management system. The
previous system, the Planning, Programming and Budgeting
system, has been changed to operate in a biennial time-frame.
Although the actual changes in the previous system have not
been substantial, the Department of Defense is hoping that
the effects of the changes will be. However, not all of the
participants in the formation of the national defense policy
support the biennial process. Some of those who oppose the
biennial budget are in a position to frustrate the success of
it.
This paper contains a look at the implementation of the
biennial budget within the Department of Defense. Addition-
ally, fiscal changes that have accompanied biennial budgeting
are identified. Next, the arguments both for and against
biennial budgeting are discussed. Finally, an assessment of
the current implementation of biennial budgeting and its
potential effects is given.
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